Adversarial Defense of Image Classification Using a Variational
  Auto-Encoder by Luo, Yi & Pfister, Henry
Adversarial Defense of Image Classification Using a Variational Auto-Encoder
Yi Luo
Duke University
Durham, NC, USA
yi.luo4@duke.edu
Henry Pfister
Duke University
Durham, NC, USA
henry.pfister@duke.edu
Abstract
Deep neural networks are known to be vulnerable to ad-
versarial attacks. This exposes them to potential exploits
in security-sensitive applications and highlights their lack
of robustness. This paper uses a variational auto-encoder
(VAE) to defend against adversarial attacks for image clas-
sification tasks. This VAE defense has a few nice proper-
ties: (1) it is quite flexible and its use of randomness makes
it harder to attack; (2) it can learn disentangled represen-
tations that prevent blurry reconstruction; and (3) a patch-
wise VAE defense strategy is used that does not require re-
training for different size images. For moderate to severe
attacks, this system outperforms or closely matches the per-
formance of JPEG compression, with the best quality pa-
rameter. It also has more flexibility and potential for im-
provement via training.
1. Introduction
Deep neural network (DNNs) now provide state-of-the-
art performance in many tasks related to computer vi-
sion and pattern recognition [8]. As the applications of
deep learning expand, DNNs are more likely to be used
in security-sensitive systems, such as medical imaging, au-
tonomous driving, and surveillance systems. The reliabil-
ity and robustness of deep learning for these applications
is essential and cannot be ignored. A DNN, like many
other systems, can be attacked purposefully using carefully
crafted methods. For example, results have shown that
DNNs are vulnerable against a variety of adversarial at-
tacks [4, 7, 9, 18, 24].
Adversarial attacks are designed to maliciously add
small perturbations to the original input in order to fool the
neural network into making incorrect predictions. For typ-
ical adversarial attacks, a key element is that the adversary
knows in advance which classifier will be used and can de-
sign the perturbation using knowledge of the classifier. Of
course, there is a trade-off between the size of the pertur-
bation and its effectiveness. In many cases, the adversary
can greatly increase the classification error rate by adding a
perturbation that is almost imperceptible [3, 17].
In an abstract sense, one can model the adversarial clas-
sification problem as a two-player zero-sum game. In this
game, the attacking player wins if the classifier makes an
error and the defending player wins if the classifier is cor-
rect. A single point is awarded to the winner and no points
are awarded to the loser. It is worth noting that the attacker
has an advantage because their move depends on the true
image while the defender’s move can only depend on the
perturbed image. This is a game with imperfect information
because the defender does not see the original image. In
games of this type, it is well-known that both players may
benefit from using randomized strategies. This is because, if
one player fixes their strategy, then the other can always op-
timize against it. Although current adversarial models typ-
ically consider less complicated scenarios, this framework
motivated us to choose a VAE due to its use of randomness.
The asymmetry between the attack and defense in current
adversarial models is also apparent in paper that design de-
fense mechanisms for varied attacks [12, 27].
Adversarial training methods, which retrain the original
neural network with additional adversarial examples [9],
can learn to defend against specific attacks on which they
are trained. But, as mentioned earlier, attackers still have
an advantage because the cost of altering the attack is
much lower than retraining with new adversarial examples.
Therefore, researchers continue to search for a universal de-
fense that performs well against a wide range of attacks.
One example of an efficient low-cost defense is JPEG com-
pression [5].
Meanwhile, recent works have also shown that random-
ness can be quite effective for defense [6, 28]. The contri-
butions of our paper can be listed as follows:
• A novel defense is proposed for adversarial attacks
on image classification networks which uses a varia-
tional auto-encoder (VAE) to reconstruct the input im-
age before classification by the targeted neural network
model. This defense method does not modify the de-
ployed network nor does it depend on the particular
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(a) ”Panda” Original image. (b) ”Dog” Adversarial image. (c) ”Panda” VAE reconstructed image.
Figure 1. Classification results of original image, adversarial image and VAE reconstructed image.
attack chosen. Thus, it is universal.
• Our defense strategy uses randomness in our via the
random sampling process in the VAE. Patch-wise de-
fense is used for large images to reducing the training
cost of the VAE.
• The proposed method is flexible and has multiple tun-
able hyper-parameters. Even without retraining the
VAE, the defense can be altered by modifying the re-
construction process. Experiments show that this de-
fense is capable of matching the performance other de-
fenses based on JPEG compression. Due to its flexi-
bility, however, it has more potential for improvement
and integration with other methods.
2. Related Work
2.1. Adversarial Attacks
Consider a classification problem for images x ∈ Rn
where there are m classes labeled by [m] , {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
For this problem, a neural network f(x; θ) with parameters
θ ∈ Θ maps an input image x ∈ Rn to a vector z ∈ Rm and
the index yˆ of the largest value in z is returned as the es-
timated class label. Training is typically handled by using
some form of stochastic gradient descent (SGD) to itera-
tively update θ in a way that reduces the training loss
L(θ) =
∑
(x,y)∈D
`(f(x; θ), ey),
where D is the set of training pairs, ey ∈ Rm denotes the
standard basis vector with a one in the y-th position, and
`(z, zˆ) is the loss function associated with the neural net-
work outputting z when the true one-hot class vector is zˆ.
Common choices are squared-error `(z, zˆ) =
∑m
i=1 |zi −
zˆi|2 and cross-entropy `(z, zˆ) = −
∑m
i=1 zˆi log zi.
CNN Classifier Structures
Dataset Layer Shape
MNIST Input 28× 28× 1
Conv+Maxpooling(2,2) 14× 14× 32
Conv+Maxpooling(2,2) 7× 7× 64
Dense+Dropout(0.4) 1024
Dense 10
CIFAR-10 Input 32× 32× 3
(Conv+BatchNorm)×2 32× 32× 32
Maxpooling(2,2) 16× 16× 32
Dropout(0.2)
(Conv+BatchNorm)×2 16× 16× 64
Maxpooling(2,2) 8× 8× 64
Dropout(0.3)
(Conv+BatchNorm)×2 8× 8× 128
Maxpooling(2,2) 4× 4× 128
Dropout(0.4)
Dense 10
NIPS 2017 Input 299× 299× 3
Inception V3 net 1001
Table 1. CNN classifiers structures for experiment. MNIST and
CIFAR-10 models are trained from scratch with Stochastic Gra-
dient Descent (SGD). For NIPS 2017 dataset the model is a pre-
trained Inception V3 model.
For a particular input x with true class y, an adversarial
attack on this network adds a perturbation to create xˆ such
that ‖x − xˆ‖ is small and yˆ 6= y, where ‖ · ‖ is some norm
on Rn. A targeted attack chooses the value of yˆ in advance
while a non-targeted attack is free to choose any yˆ 6= y.
For an input x with class label y, many attack methods
are based computing the gradient ∇x`(f(x; θ), ey) to find
perturbation directions that increase the loss function and,
thus, cause the network to misclassify x. In this paper, we
mainly focus on the following attack methods:
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [9]: FGSM is a
gradient-based single-step attack method. It is quite fast
and it generates adversarial images by adding or subtract-
ing a fixed amount from each pixel in the image. For each
pixel, the sign of the perturbation is determined by the sign
of the gradient of the loss function with respect to the im-
age. For an image x, the adversarial image would be
xˆ = clip(x+  · sign(∇x`(f(x; θ), ey)),
where clip clips a vector to minimum/maximum pixel val-
ues and sign computes for the element-wise sign of the cor-
responding gradient.
Iterative FGSM (I-FGSM) [16]: I-FGSM is based on
repeating the FGSM attack M times with x0 = x,
xm+1 = clip(xm + (/M) · sign
(∇x`(f(xm; θ), ey)),
and xˆ = xM . During each iteration, xm+1 is created by
attacking xm with FGSM method and  reduced by a factor
of M . The adversarial input xˆ is the output of the final
iteration.
2.2. Defense
There are two primary methods of defense against ad-
versarial attacks. The first type modifies the structure of the
classifier and/or changes the training procedure [10, 19].
The second type does not change the classifier but in-
stead focuses on modifying the input vector to mitigate at-
tacks [6, 17, 20, 22]. The goal of the second type is to de-
tect and/or remove adversarial perturbations before passing
the data to the classifier. In this case, one needs to design
a transformation T that maps images to images and mini-
mizes the effect if adversarial perturbations.
For an adversarial image xˆ with true class label y, the
attack implies that y 6= yˆ, where yˆ denotes the class label
estimated by the classifier. When the defense is activated,
the system instead passes T (xˆ) to the classifier and this re-
sults in the class vector z˜ = f(T (xˆ); θ) and the estimated
class label y˜. If the defense is successful, then y˜ = y and
the image is classified correctly.
As mentioned by Shaham et al. [22], one good choice for
T is a basis transformation followed by scaling and/or quan-
tization, which includes defenses such as low-pass filtering
and JPEG compression. The success of these methods is
attributed to the fact that they alter the image significantly
and tend to reduce adversarial perturbations.
JPEG Compression [26] is a lossy image compression
method that first applies the two-dimensional discrete co-
sine transform to 8 × 8 image patches. Then, it quantizes
the resulting coefficients (using more bits for lower frequen-
cies) and uses lossless compression to compress the quan-
tized values. We note that lossless compression plays no
role in the adversarial defense and can be ignored in this
application. There is a quality parameter that controls the
amount of information loss during the compression. In our
experiments, different quality parameters provide different
defense performance depending on the attack strength.
Variational Auto-encoder Structures
Dataset Layer Shape
MNIST Input 28× 28× 1
Conv+Maxpooling(2,2) 14× 14× 16
Conv+Maxpooling(2,2) 7× 7× 8
Dense 256
CIFAR-10 Input 32× 32× 3
Conv+Maxpooling(2,2) 16× 16× 64
Conv 16× 16× 32
Conv 16× 16× 16
Dense 1024
Table 2. Variational-autoencoder encoder structures. The decoder
structures for each model is symmetric, using transpose convolu-
tion and upsampling.
NIPS 2017 VAE Encoder Structures
Patch Size Layer Shape
16× 16 Input 16× 16× 3
Conv+Maxpooling(2,2) 8× 8× 64
Conv 8× 8× 32
Conv 8× 8× 16
Dense 512
32× 32 Input 32× 32× 3
Conv+Maxpooling(2,2) 16× 16× 64
Conv 16× 16× 32
Conv 16× 16× 16
Dense 512
64× 64 Input 32× 32× 3
Conv+Maxpooling(2,2) 32× 32× 128
Conv 32× 32× 64
Conv 32× 32× 32
Dense 1024
Table 3. Variational-autoencoder encoder structures for NIPS 2017
dataset. The decoder structures for each model is symmetric, using
transpose convolution and upsampling.
3. Variational Auto-encoder (VAE)
A variational auto-encoder [14, 21] is a neural-network
model that maps a high-dimensional feature vector to a
lower-dimensional latent vector and then incorporates ran-
domness before mapping it back to the original feature
space. It can be seen as a standard auto-encoder, with an
encoder and a decoder, but with a random sampling opera-
tion separating the two [1].
In our case, we use a VAE where the encoder determines
the mean and variance of a Gaussian random vector that is
then mapped back to an image by the decoder. In this case,
the encoder is a convolutional neural network parametrized
by θ, denoted as qθ(z|x), which maps the input x ∈ Rn to
the random latent vector z ∈ Rd. The deterministic part
of the encoder acts like a compressor [25] by mapping the
key features of the input to a lower-dimensional represen-
tation. The decoder is a de-convolutional neural network
parametrized by φ, denoted as pφ(x′|z) which takes a vec-
tor z as input and reconstructs an image x′ ∈ Rn as the
output. Auto-encoders are trained by optimizing a single
loss function that measures a distance between input image
x and output image x′.
The key difference between a VAE and an ordinary auto-
encoder is that, instead of the encoder neural network map-
ping directly to the latent space, it outputs the mean and
variance, µz and σz , of the sampled latent vector z. Then,
z is drawn from a Gaussian distribution with mean µz and
diagonal covariance matrix diag(σz). Finally, the sampled
vector z is passed into the decoder and used to produce the
output image x′. Instead of trying to approximate the out-
put image exactly, a VAE defines a conditional distribution
that approximates the underlying continuous distribution of
images. Thus, the VAE provides a generative model for im-
ages similar to the input image.
In order to learn the parameters of a VAE, the optimized
loss function typically consists of two parts: the recon-
struction loss and the KL-divergence loss [15]. The first
term penalizes the error between the reconstructed image
and the input image while the second term encourages the
mean/variance pairs for latent variable that are far from a
standard Gaussian vector. The loss function for the i-th im-
age in the training set is given by
li(θ, φ) =Ez∼qθ(z|xi)[− log(pφ(xi|z)]
+DKL(qθ(z|xi)||p(z)),
where p(z) is a standard Gaussian distribution on Rd,
qθ(z|xi) is a Gaussian distribution whose mean and vari-
ance are given by the encoder neural network, and pφ(xi|z)
is a distribution associated with the reconstruction error
term. For mean-squared error, pφ first maps z to x′ using
the de-convolutional neural network with parameters φ and
then defines
pφ(xi|z) = (2pi)−n/2 exp(−‖xi − x′‖2/2),
where ‖·‖ is the Euclidean norm. Alternatively, one can use
binary cross-entropy loss between xi and x′ to define pφ.
For the Gaussian case, a ”reparameterization trick” al-
lows backpropagation to calculate the gradients during
training. The idea is to represent the random sampling pro-
cess in a differentiable form, where the mean µz is added to
standard Gaussian noise which is multiplied by the σz .
Disentanglement. When we obtain the latent vector
compressed by the VAE, we want every component of the
latent vector to represent different features of the original
image. Disentangled variational auto-encoders are designed
to approach this goal [2, 11]. Disentanglement is applied by
modifying the optimization loss function and adding the hy-
perparameter β to get
li(θ, φ) = −Ez∼qθ(z|xi)[log(pφ(xi|z)]
+βDKL(qθ(z|xi)||p(z))
In our experiments, we adjusted the β hyperparameter to
reduce the weight of KL-Divergence loss. This pushed the
VAE towards higher-quality reconstruction with less ran-
domness.
FGSM Attack on MNIST
L2 Diff No Def JPEG 23 Ours
0.011 0.988 0.988 0.987
0.066 0.972 0.978 0.980
0.119 0.921 0.945 0.967
0.171 0.796 0.863 0.941
0.220 0.573 0.686 0.896
0.257 0.408 0.505 0.845
Table 4. Top-1 accuracies on MNIST test set after applying FGSM
attack, JPEG defense and our defense. Our defense is very effec-
tive compared to JPEG as the perturbation gets larger.
FGSM Attack on CIFAR-10
L2 Diff No Def JPEG 23 Ours
0.010 0.496 0.644 0.709
0.064 0.124 0.483 0.521
0.118 0.105 0.323 0.347
0.171 0.098 0.217 0.258
0.197 0.094 0.201 0.233
Table 5. Top-1 accuracies on CIFAR-10 test set. Our VAE defense
outperforms JPEG consistently.
4. Experimental Setup
In this section, we describe the datasets, CNN mod-
els, variational auto-encoder models, attacks and evaluation
metrics used for our experiments.
Datasets. We use three different datasets: MNIST,
CIFAR-10 and the NIPS 2017 Defense Against Adversar-
ial Attacks development dataset1. MNIST is a dataset of
handwritten digits where each image is a 28 × 28 × 1
gray-scale image labeled one of ten classes from 0 to 9.
There are 60000 training images and 10000 testing images.
CIFAR-10 is a ten-class image dataset where each image is
a 32 × 32 × 3 RGB image. There are 50000 training im-
ages and 10000 testing images. The NIPS 2017 Defense
Against Adversarial Attacks development dataset is a 1001-
class image dataset where each image is 299× 299 times3
1NIPS 2017 Defense Against Adversarial Attacks Kaggle Competition
Dataset https://www.kaggle.com/c/nips-2017-defense-against-adversarial-
attack/data
Figure 2. FGSM and I-FGSM attack on MNIST. Our VAE defense significantly outperforms JPEG compression of different qualities.
Figure 3. FGSM and I-FGSM attack on CIFAR-10. Our VAE defense outperforms JPEG compression in most cases. But, for low quality
(10) and large perturbations, JPEG outperforms our VAE due to larger information loss, which also removes adversarial perturbations.
RGB image obtained from Imagenet. We have access to the
1000 images provided by the competition in the develop-
ment set.
CNN Classifiers. For MNIST and CIFAR-10, we set
up our own CNN classifiers and train them for the classi-
fication. For NIPS dataset, we use the pre-trained 1001-
class Inception V3 model [23] provided by the NIPS Kaggle
competition1. The structure of each classifiers is described
in Table 1. Before being attacked by any adversarial attack,
the classification accuracy on the MNIST test set, CIFAR-
10 test set and NIPS 2017 dataset are 0.9904, 0.8663 and
0.945 respectively. We use these as baselines when evaluat-
ing our defense.
Attacks. All our attacks are white-box attacks. Thus, We
assume that the attacker has access to the parameters of the
deployed classifier, but is not aware of the defense strate-
gies. In order to make our defense universal, we only train
our VAEs to reconstruct original images instead of learning
to reconstruct original images from attacked images (ad-
versarial training). We use FGSM, I-FGSM as our attack
methods. For MNIST, we set  ∈ [0, 0.12] for FGSM and
I-FGSM, the number of iterations for I-FGSM is 10. For
CIFAR-10, we set  ∈ [0, 0.1] for FGSM and I-FGSM, the
number of iterations for I-FGSM is 10. For NIPS, we set
 ∈ [0.005, 0.09] for FGSM, following the same settings as
Shaham et al. [22].
Defense. We evaluate our defense along with JPEG com-
pression, which is the overall best basis transformation used
as defense proposed by Shaham et al. [22]. Following their
results on tuning the JPEG quality parameter, we consider
the JPEG quality of 23 and also evaluate the performance
of other JPEG qualities.
Evaluation. We evaluate the performance of the attacks
and defense on top-1 prediction accuracy versus the aver-
age relative L2 difference between original and attacked im-
ages. The average relative L2 difference is defined to be
L2 Diff =
1
N
N∑
i=1
||xi − xˆi||2
||xi||2 .
Normally a larger L2 difference results in larger perturba-
tions which cause more errors in classification. However,
for a more efficient attack, a relatively small L2 difference
Figure 4. An schematic diagram of patch-wise reconstruction with 3× 3 patches and a stride of 1.
can result in a significant decrease in the classification accu-
racy. For example, in tables 6 and 7, a normalized relative
L2 difference of 0.01 results in 0.35 and 0.15 accuracy for
FGSM attack and I-FGSM attack respectively. I-FGSM is
a more precisely crafted attack adding small perturbations
that confuses the classifier more efficiently.
5. Variational auto-encoder training
Models. We trained multiple variational auto-encoder
models from scratch. The encoder structures for MNIST
and CIFAR-10 are in Table 2. The decoder structure are
mirror images of the encoders. For MNIST and CIFAR-10,
we train the VAE on the training set images and evaluate the
defense on the testing set.
For NIPS 2017 dataset, the size of original images are
299 × 299 × 3. Instead of training an auto-encoder on the
original images, we decided to train our VAE on patches
randomly extracted from the 1000 original images provided.
In this way, the model is easier to train and a patch-wise
reconstruction is much more flexible. We use three different
input patch sizes, 16× 16, 32× 32 and 64× 64.
Training. We use the ADAM optimizer [13] to perform
the end-to-end training process independently of the attack.
For the NIPS 2017 dataset, we also made some modifica-
tions to the model structure. In particular, a tunable clipping
value to the noise  ∼ N(0, 1) was added for sampling the
latent space. This restricts the random Gaussian noise to be
within the range of clipping. We set the default value for
clipping to [-5, 5] and used it for training. For each training
process, we trained enough epochs until the first term in the
loss function changes very little.
6. Results
MNIST. For MNIST, our defense is much more effec-
tive against the FGSM than JPEG. The results are consistent
as we tune the FGSM and I-FGSM parameter to enhance
the attack and cause a different amount of perturbations. In
Table 4, for example, our VAE defense maintains an ac-
curacy of 0.845 while JPEG (quality 23) defense can only
defend the network from 0.408 to 0.505. The results for the
I-FGSM attack are shown in Figure 2.
CIFAR-10. For CIFAR-10, our defense also outper-
forms JPEG compression consistently in general. For small
and large perturbations, our VAE defense maintains about
3% ∼ 6% higher accuracy than JPEG with quality parame-
ter 23. However, if we set the quality parameter to be com-
paratively low (10), at small adversarial perturbations JPEG
compression restores a lot fewer images for correct classi-
fication due to the information loss. But, as the adversarial
perturbation gets larger, JPEG surpasses the performance of
VAE because the significant information loss also removes
most of the adversarial perturbations.
NIPS 2017. For the NIPS 2017 dataset, we trained
three different VAE models with different input image sizes,
16 × 16, 32 × 32 and 64 × 64. The training data are ran-
domly extracted patches from the 1000 images. Since the
original images are 299 × 299 × 3, the training process
would be very time consuming if we directly trained a vari-
ational auto-encoder on the images. In order to decrease
training time and add flexibility, we decided to apply our
image reconstruction on patches. Our approach is to extract
patches from the original image, reconstruct the image with
our trained VAE, stack reconstructed patches together and
average the overlapping parts.
Here, we introduce another hyper-parameter for our VAE
defense: the stride of the reconstruction process where we
stack overlapping pixels and take the average. A smaller
stride results in more overlapping area and creates higher-
quality images. But, it tends to also preserve the adversarial
perturbations. We also improve the defense’s flexibility by
adding this as a hyperparameter. Figure 4 shows an example
of image reconstruction with 3×3 patches and a stride of 1.
Reconstruction of images from patches typically suffers
from sharp edges between patches stitched together. If we
only stack overlapping patches and average the pixel values,
we still suffer from significant artifacts near the corners and
edges of the stacked patches. The worst effect is that these
edge effects behave like additive noise for the classifier. To
mitigate this problem, we also apply a 5× 5 smoothing fil-
ter to every image we reconstruct from patches. While the
edge effects are significantly reduced, the smoothing filter
also blurs the image. To compensate for this blurriness, we
adjust the hyper-parameter β and train the model longer to
JPEG VAE 16× 16 p VAE 32× 32 p VAE 64× 64 p
L2 Diff No Def JPEG 10 JPEG 23 Stride 16 Stride 32 Stride 32 Stride 64 Ensembled
0.010 0.350 0.768 0.860 0.802 0.782 0.782 0.762 0.845
0.023 0.235 0.743 0.792 0.764 0.759 0.767 0.75 0.789
0.037 0.220 0.730 0.721 0.719 0.724 0.736 0.731 0.745
0.052 0.213 0.709 0.652 0.675 0.698 0.709 0.711 0.689
0.066 0.215 0.687 0.596 0.627 0.677 0.686 0.692 0.658
0.095 0.232 0.652 0.501 0.576 0.624 0.647 0.649 0.59
0.109 0.233 0.611 0.469 0.544 0.592 0.625 0.622 0.557
0.124 0.240 0.602 0.461 0.532 0.569 0.61 0.611 0.537
0.138 0.241 0.578 0.433 0.522 0.569 0.585 0.588 0.528
0.152 0.247 0.569 0.426 0.497 0.524 0.564 0.569 0.509
0.167 0.253 0.548 0.401 0.47 0.512 0.548 0.563 0.494
Table 6. Top-1 accuracies on NIPS 2017 dataset under FGSM attack.
JPEG VAE 16× 16 p VAE 32× 32 p VAE 64× 64 p
L2 Diff No Def JPEG 10 JPEG 23 Stride 16 Stride 32 Stride 32 Stride 64 Ensembled
0.01043 0.15 0.761 0.85 0.808 0.774 0.781 0.763 0.846
0.017752 0.05 0.751 0.804 0.772 0.759 0.764 0.75 0.803
0.019472 0.044 0.752 0.806 0.783 0.771 0.76 0.753 0.796
0.027197 0.033 0.735 0.769 0.758 0.741 0.755 0.743 0.778
0.028969 0.032 0.728 0.763 0.747 0.74 0.757 0.752 0.776
0.042603 0.025 0.719 0.706 0.701 0.715 0.739 0.723 0.736
0.050261 0.024 0.712 0.657 0.675 0.692 0.723 0.711 0.689
0.052266 0.024 0.703 0.651 0.673 0.698 0.714 0.709 0.699
0.06017 0.022 0.704 0.611 0.629 0.674 0.698 0.697 0.653
0.072137 0.022 0.678 0.526 0.609 0.655 0.676 0.678 0.619
0.074035 0.02 0.678 0.526 0.614 0.655 0.679 0.678 0.623
Table 7. Top-1 accuracies on NIPS 2017 dataset under I-FGSM attack.
achieve more precise reconstruction of the images. The end
result was that the smoothing filter increased the classifi-
cation accuracy on VAE reconstructed images by roughly
10%, for both benign and attacked images.
Table 6 shows the performance of our VAE defense on
the NIPS 2017 dataset under FGSM attack. We apply VAE
models of different input sizes with different reconstruc-
tion strides. Our best single model is the 64 × 64 patch
VAE model. With an 0.167 average relative L2 differ-
ence between original and adversarial images, the model
restores the classification accuracy back to 0.563. In this
case, JPEG compression of quality 10 reaches an accuracy
of 0.548. However, for small perturbations (0.01 L2 dif-
ference), JPEG compression of quality 23 significantly out-
performs any other model, restoring the accuracy to 0.86.
But the performance of 23 quality JPEG drops rapidly as
the L2 difference increases. Eventually, it ends up with an
accuracy of 0.0401, which is the lowest.
Through these experiments, we can observe that a bet-
ter reconstruction of the original image results in better de-
fense against small perturbations but fails to remove adver-
sarial noise as the perturbations get larger. Our 16× 16 and
32 × 32 patch VAE models show similar results and their
defense against small perturbations is better than 64 × 64
patch model. But, this advantage does not persist as the
attack becomes severe.
To overcome this disadvantages of each patch size, we
also considered a ensemble-averaged output of the four
VAE models in the table. To compute this, the pixels of the
four independent VAE reconstructions are averaged. The
last column shows the performance of the ensemble aver-
aged output. Its performance approaches that of JPEG qual-
ity 10 on small perturbations while maintaining a better per-
formance for larger perturbations.
The I-FGSM attack is a more efficient attack than the
FGSM attack. I-FGSM creates small perturbations (0.07
average relative L2 difference) that significantly decrease
the classification accuracy to 0.02. As shown in Table 7,
a single 64 × 64 patch VAE model is capable of restoring
the classification accuracy from 0.025 to 0.739. From the
results, we see that the ensemble-averaged model provides
better defense against small perturbations than any single
VAE model but sacrifices performance when facing larger
perturbations.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the performance of variational
auto-encoders (VAE) designed to defend against adversarial
attacks and proposed a patch-wise reconstruction method
for large resolution images. The proposed method turned
out to be robust against FGSM and I-FGSM adversarial at-
tacks.
In future work, we plan to improve these strategies by
modifying the training to more directly reward the removal
of adversarial attacks. During our experiments, we ob-
served that our method is less effective for small perturba-
tions to large images. Thus, we are currently considering
modified VAE structures to overcome this weakness.
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